Daily Edition No. 12 Monday, September 14, 2026 · Updated 07:45 Gulf thesaudi.info A MEFILES title

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Politics · Economics · Power · Read from Riyadh, not about it

Hormuz & Security · The Red Sea Front

Yemen, Bab al-Mandab and the Yanbu bypass · the second strait that decides whether the first one matters.

The Southern Front

Aden Admits 500 Dead and Calls the Coast "Painful," Sana'a Counts 58 Saudi Sorties in a Day, and Riyadh Still Says Nothing: The War Is Real on Every Side but the One Fighting It

The National Resistance gave its first four-week toll, the presidential council's Rashad al-Alimi called the loss of the coast "incidental" while Sultan al-Arada called it "painful and regrettable," the Houthis claimed 58 Saudi airstrikes in 24 hours and a strike on Sharurah, and the IOM's displacement count passed 82,000.

The displacement count, three readings in two daysPeople displaced in Yemen since the start of September, per the IOM
IOM, Saturday Sep 12 (AFP)
76,000
IOM, Sunday Sep 13 (AP)
82,000+
IOM, Sunday Sep 13 (AFP)
~86,000
IOM figures via AFP and the Guardian (Sep 13), AP (Sep 13) and AFP via RFI (Sep 14). Bars scaled 0 to 100,000. The two Sunday readings are the same agency reported by two wires, "more than 82,000" and "nearly 86,000"; the gap is a reporting difference, not a measured rise. AP dates the count from the start of September, AFP from "recent weeks." More than 2,000 people have reached Djibouti per the IOM.

The government side spoke in two registers on Saturday night and Sunday. Sultan al-Arada, a member of the presidential leadership council, told a televised interview aired late Saturday that the collapse of government forces at Mokha and along the west coast was "painful and regrettable" and that forces "are currently regrouping and will return to the battle," per AP. On Sunday Rashad al-Alimi, who chairs the council, described the defeats as "incidental" in comments carried by Saba and said the government "will remain clear and fixed on the goal of retrieving (state) institutions and of reclaiming sovereignty over all national territories." The National Resistance, the government-allied force that had held the coast, said more than 500 of its fighters had been killed on the west coast in four weeks, its first comprehensive toll, and claimed more than 1,000 Houthis killed in Hodeida and Taiz; a Houthi spokesman did not respond to AP. The Yemeni military said it struck Houthi positions in Mokha, Dhubab and elsewhere in Taiz on Sunday. The Houthis, via Saba, said four commanders of Saudi-backed forces were killed and five wounded near Bab al-Mandab.

The Saudi side of the front remains unacknowledged by Riyadh. Yahya Saree said on Telegram that "the criminal Saudi enemy has carried out 58 airstrikes in the past 24 hours," per AFP; Almasirah reported two Saudi strikes on Saada, artillery in Monabbih, and later two strikes on a market in Al-Jawf. The Houthis have reported more than 100 strikes since Tuesday, AFP notes, with no confirmation from Riyadh, and the strikes as reported have stayed on the front lines rather than Sanaa. Saree also claimed drones and missiles against the Sharurah base, without evidence or a date, per AP. On the Saudi side the civil defence sent and quickly lifted alerts for Abha and the Khamis Mushait area on Sunday, and confirmed Saturday night's projectile in Jazan that injured two and damaged a mosque and buildings; state media on Sunday released footage of that damage, per Reuters. AP's line is precise: "Saudi Arabia did not announce any new attacks targeting the Houthis."

Assessment

The judgment is that the coalition now has a ground partner that admits defeat, a toll that admits scale, and an air campaign that admits nothing. The 500 figure is the government's own and is the first number from that side that can be checked against later UN or hospital counts; the 58 and the "more than 100" are the Houthis' and remain unverified. What Riyadh's silence buys is deniability towards Washington and Tehran, both of which said this weekend that they are not at war with the Kingdom's enemy or with the Kingdom; what it costs is that the Houthi account is the only daily ledger of the air war. The observable is whether the Saudi ministry of defence or the coalition names a single strike by place and date, and whether the National Resistance's next toll rises or is contradicted by the UN.

The Royal Court

Decisions, diplomacy and the alliances that carry them · read as a system, not as ceremony.

The Foreign Minister

"Non-Negotiable" in New Delhi, Then Four Phone Calls: Prince Faisal Builds the GCC Line on Hormuz One Readout at a Time While the Meeting That Would Test It Slips

The foreign minister told the BRICS summit that Gulf states reject any targeting of their "territories, facilities or vital interests, regardless of the pretexts or labels," and the readouts from London, Doha and Abu Dhabi that bracket the speech all mention navigation and none mentions Salalah.

The foreign minister's weekend, by readoutWho published what, Saturday to Monday
Miliband call Sep 12 · SPA Qatar PM call Sep 13 · Doha MoFA BRICS speech Sep 13 · New Delhi Salalah postponed Sep 13 · Albusaidi Abdullah bin Zayed Sep 14 · UAE MoFA
Miliband per SPA via Arab News (Sep 12); Qatar per the Qatari MoFA readout (Sep 13); speech per Arab News (Sep 13); postponement per the Guardian and Iran International (Sep 13 and 14); UAE per the UAE MoFA readout dated Sep 14. Ordered by publication, not to scale. A Kuwaiti call is reported by Iran International without a primary readout and is not plotted.

Prince Faisal bin Farhan told the BRICS summit in New Delhi on Sunday that Saudi Arabia's national security, territorial integrity and resources are "non-negotiable," that the six GCC states reject any targeting of their "territories, facilities or vital interests, regardless of the pretexts or labels," and that "continued confrontation cannot be the path to a lasting settlement," per Arab News. He tied the stability of Hormuz and other waterways directly to energy security and trade, warning that "any disruption will have consequences that extend beyond the region," and said the crises exposed a need to "re-evaluate the capacity of the international system to keep pace with a rapidly changing global reality." Arab News adds that GCC states have repeatedly called for unconditional reopening of the strait and rejected fees or unilateral arrangements, which is the position the Omani-Iranian text is reported to have tested.

The readouts around the speech are consistent in what they include and omit. Qatar's prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, spoke with Prince Faisal on Sunday and, per Doha's readout, said Qatar "supports all diplomatic efforts seeking to reach a resolution that guarantees freedom of maritime traffic, paving the way for a comprehensive agreement." Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed's call, per the UAE ministry's readout dated Monday, covered "regional developments and ways to strengthen ongoing efforts to achieve lasting security and stability." Ed Miliband, on Saturday per SPA, affirmed "the Kingdom's right to take necessary measures to defend its security and resources in accordance with international law" and joint work on freedom of navigation; no British statement of Red Sea tasking followed, and that observable from Edition 11 stays not established. None of the three readouts names Salalah, Iran or the Houthis. Earlier in the weekend Pezeshkian met Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed in New Delhi, and Anwar Gargash described the Abu Dhabi approach as deterrence and diplomacy that "begin from a position of parity and capability."

Assessment

The judgment is that the foreign minister is assembling a Gulf consensus by readout precisely because the consensus could not survive a meeting. Doha's line, freedom of maritime traffic as the precondition for a comprehensive agreement, is the Saudi line in Qatari grammar; Abu Dhabi's is the same content with Gargash's "parity and capability" attached; London's adds the legal cover for Saudi action in Yemen. What is missing is any reference by any of them to the Omani corridor, which is the inference behind the postponement: three GCC capitals were not prepared to be seen endorsing a text that Riyadh had asked to amend. The observable is the next Omani announcement, and whether the GCC secretariat or a joint ministerial statement replaces the bilateral readouts with one position on Hormuz.

Restraint as Policy

Islamabad Calls to Praise Saudi "Restraint," Baghdad Reopens the Crossings It Closed, and Washington Says It Wants a Nuclear Deal, Not a Strait: Riyadh's No-Retaliation Line Is Now Everyone Else's Comfort

Shehbaz Sharif's Sunday call condemned the Houthis and the pipeline attack and praised the Kingdom's restraint towards Iraq, while Baghdad moved from dismissals and closures on Saturday to reopening Shalamcheh for Monday, and Trump said Iran "wants to make a deal so badly."

What Baghdad did, and what it undidIraqi measures after Riyadh said the drones came from Iraq
2
Officials dismissed in Maysan on Saturday, the military commander and the police chief, after Iraq confirmed the launch site
3
Border crossings with Iran closed on Saturday, per Iraqi officials to AFP, as part of an effort to track the perpetrators and stop drone smuggling
15
Drone-launch platforms Iraq said it seized, per Al Arabiya via Iran International
Sep 30
Baghdad's deadline for militia disarmament and for the withdrawal of remaining US-led coalition forces; Kataib Hezbollah has said it will not comply
Dismissals and closures per DW and AFP via Iran International (Sep 12 and 13); platforms per Al Arabiya via Iran International (Sep 13), not independently confirmed; deadline per DW (Sep 12). Commercial traffic through Shalamcheh was expected to resume on Monday per Iran International; no group has been named by Baghdad or Riyadh, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has denied responsibility via Tasnim.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received a call on Sunday from Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who, per SPA via Arab News, condemned the Houthi attacks on the Kingdom and "the militia's blatant violations of the Kingdom's sovereignty and territorial integrity," condemned the attacks on its oil infrastructure, and "praised the Kingdom's position of restraint and its support for the efforts of the Iraqi government to prevent its territory from being used to attack the Kingdom and neighboring countries." That last clause is the Saudi policy stated in a foreign leader's mouth: DW reported on Saturday that Riyadh said it would not retaliate for the pipeline attack in order to give Baghdad "an opportunity to take the necessary measures." Baghdad took some. It dismissed the Maysan commander and police chief, closed three crossings with Iran per AFP, and, per Al Arabiya via Iran International, seized 15 drone-launch platforms; Iran's ambassador in Baghdad, Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh, told Tasnim that Tehran was in talks with senior Iraqi officials about the Chazabeh and Shalamcheh closures, and by Sunday night Iran International reported that commercial traffic through Shalamcheh was expected to resume on Monday. No group has been named, the Popular Mobilization Forces denied involvement per DW, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq told Tasnim that such an attack would be "a source of pride if we had carried out such an action" while insisting it had not.

Washington's frame narrowed in parallel. Trump said on Sunday that Iran "wants to make a deal so badly" and suggested the war could end around the November midterms, per Iran International; CNN reported that the administration wants talks focused on the nuclear programme rather than on Hormuz. Read with Saturday's Reuters sourcing on the Crown Prince's Thursday call, which Edition 11 carried, the American position towards Riyadh is now consistent across three days: intelligence for Yemen, no strikes, and a negotiating agenda in which the strait is Iran's leverage and not America's objective.

Assessment

The judgment is that Saudi restraint towards Iraq has become the point of consensus that every other capital cites, which makes it harder to abandon and cheaper for Baghdad to reward with gestures. The dismissals and the seizure of platforms are real but reversible; the reopening of Shalamcheh within 48 hours is the tell that Baghdad's pressure on the militias will not outlast Tehran's pressure on Baghdad. The September 30 deadline, which coincides with the coalition withdrawal, is the date on which Iraq's ability to guarantee its own territory will be tested with fewer American forces in it. The observable is whether Iraq names the group, and whether Riyadh's silence on retaliation survives a second launch from the same province.

Oil & Energy

The barrel as instrument · OSPs, OPEC+, capacity and the price of a closed strait.

The Price

$107.51 at the Open, 6.2 Million at the Wellhead, 3.1 Million at the Jetty: The Market Is Pricing the Pipeline, but the August Data Show the Kingdom Was Already Half-Shut Before the Drones

Brent rose 2.77 percent in early Monday trade after an 8 percent week, IG's Tony Sycamore named the $119.48 March high as the risk, and OPEC's monthly report, per Roya News, put Saudi August output at 6.2 million barrels a day with Kpler exports at about 3.1 million, the lowest since at least 2013.

Brent, three prices that matterDollars a barrel
Friday settlement, Sep 11
104.61
Monday, 23:13 GMT Sunday
107.51
Early March high, per IG
119.48
Reuters via The Business Standard (Sep 14). Bars scaled 0 to 120. The Monday figure is an intraday print, not a settlement; the March high is as cited by IG's Tony Sycamore in a Sunday note and was not verified against exchange data. WTI was $102.32 at the same time.

Brent futures were $107.51 at 23:13 GMT on Sunday, up $2.90 or 2.77 percent, after rising more than 3 percent at the open; WTI was $102.32, up $2.27. Reuters attributes the move to the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia, the Iranian attacks on ships in the Gulf and the pipeline closure, and notes the benchmark rose 8 percent last week, its first close above $100 since July. IG's Tony Sycamore wrote on Sunday that "unless this week's talks in Oman produce something operational, or the East-West pipeline is brought back online quickly, the risk is that crude oil continues to extend its gains toward the $119.48 high of early March"; the Oman talks were postponed hours later. The Guardian, with Reuters, notes US diesel passed $6 a gallon on average on Friday, a record.

The August data, reported by Roya News from OPEC's monthly report of Thursday, September 10, put Saudi output at 6.2 million barrels a day, its 2026 low and 23 percent below July's 8.1 million, after the Houthis' end-of-July "maritime embargo" deterred vessel operators from west-coast terminals; Kpler data cited in the same report put Saudi crude exports at about 3.1 million barrels a day in August against 5.1 million in July, the lowest since at least 2013. Aramco had restored production to roughly 80 percent of normal by maximising pipeline flows to Yanbu before the latest disruptions, per the same report. Edition 11 set the OPEC secondary-source figure as an observable against the IEA's 6.0 million and the Kingdom's own 6.238 million; the 6.2 million now reported sits between them, though the OPEC document itself was not fetched in this session.

Assessment

The judgment is that the market is reacting to the pipeline as if it were the shock, when the August figures show the Houthi embargo had already taken two million barrels a day out of Saudi exports before a single drone reached al-Mesabaah. The pipeline removes the bypass for what remained; the price now carries both losses at once. That is why the Sycamore condition matters in reverse: the Oman track is gone for now and the restart date is not established, so neither of his two brakes exists. The observable is Monday's settlement against $107.51, and whether OPEC's next secondary-source figure for September shows Saudi output falling below 6 million.

The Escort

Two Windows a Day: The FT Says Washington Cut Its Air Cover in Hormuz to Two Slots at the Start of September, and a Seven-Hour Transit Now Has to Fit Inside Them

NCAGS emails reported by the Financial Times narrowed the overnight protection windows on the Omani-side route to two specified transit slots, CENTCOM declined to elaborate, and Clarksons does not expect disruption to ease before the second half of 2027.

The cost of the corridorFigures the FT report puts around the US escort mission
2
Transit slots a day with US air protection since around the start of September, down from broad overnight windows, per NCAGS emails cited by the FT
7 hrs
Time a commercial ship at slow to moderate speed takes to cross the strait, the transit that must now fit a window
70+
Commercial vessels attacked since February 28, per the FT
H2 2027
Earliest point at which Clarksons expects Hormuz disruption to ease, per the FT
Financial Times reporting as carried by the Times of India (Sep 13); the FT article itself was not fetched and the Times of India page carries no visible publication timestamp beyond the search index date. CNA's Joshua Tallis put the cost of an advanced US aircraft at $25,000 to $75,000 an hour. CENTCOM said the NCAGS communications "spoke for themselves."

The Financial Times reported, per the Times of India, that the United States has restricted the hours in which it provides air protection to tankers on the southern, Omani-coast route through Hormuz, which it has covered since May. Under the arrangement shipowners obtain coordinates and transit windows from the Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping centre; emails from NCAGS to maritime advisers showed the broad overnight windows reduced around the start of September to two specified slots a day, with ships encouraged to sail at designated times for the best available support. CENTCOM declined to elaborate. The change followed a week in which Iran said it had targeted two US vessels and eight tankers in retaliation for US strikes on five Iranian tankers, and in which the IRGC used small patrol boats to detect merchant ships running dark along the Omani side. Retired Vice Admiral John Miller told the FT that round-the-clock cover would be difficult to sustain indefinitely and that some scheduling was necessary; Tallis said the change could help Washington manage the cost of a prolonged presence.

This resolves, in part, the observable Edition 11 set on the protection windows: the two-slot regime predates Sunday's UKMTO report and there is no evidence yet of a further change after it. On the other side of the corridor, Mohsen Rezaei, head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, announced a "restricted zone" extending from the US blockade line towards the strait and into the Gulf, with unspecified "sanctions" for ships entering it, per the same report, and Iran and Oman said they had agreed entry and exit routes they intended to brief to Gulf states at the meeting that has now been postponed. CENTCOM's own count of vessels redirected to enforce the blockade of Iran reached 101 on Sunday.

Assessment

The judgment is that the American escort is being rationed, and that rationing is the operational meaning of "empowering regional partners to take the lead." Two windows a day for a seven-hour transit is a schedule that favours the tankers that can wait at anchor and the owners who can pay war-risk cover for the wait; it does not favour a Saudi export programme that has just lost its bypass and has five to seven days of stocks at the other end. The Iranian "restricted zone" and the Omani corridor are two competing attempts to write the rules for the same water, and Riyadh's amendments to the corridor text are, on this reading, a refusal to let the second become the price of escaping the first. The observable is whether NCAGS widens or narrows the windows after Sunday's strike, and whether any Saudi-flagged or Bahri vessel is confirmed transiting in one.

The Economy

SAMA, GASTAT, the budget and the giga-projects · the balance sheet behind the statecraft.

The Rating

A+ and Stable, Because of the Pipeline: S&P Affirmed the Kingdom Citing the East-West Line as a Strength the Weekend the Line Was Shut, and the Stable Outlook Now Rests on a Restart Date Nobody Has Given

S&P Global affirmed Saudi Arabia at A+/A-1 with a stable outlook, forecasting a 0.9 percent contraction in 2026 and an 8.2 percent rebound in 2027, a 5.8 percent deficit this year narrowing to 3.4 percent, and a non-oil share of GDP of about 70 percent.

S&P's growth path for the KingdomReal GDP, percent, per the affirmation reported September 13
2026 forecast
-0.9
2027 forecast
+8.2
2028 to 2029 average
+3.3
S&P Global Ratings via Arab News (Sep 13). Bars show absolute magnitude scaled 0 to 10; the 2026 bar represents a contraction, not growth. These are agency projections that assume higher oil production in 2027, and the affirmation was published before the pipeline shutdown's duration was known.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed Saudi Arabia's long- and short-term sovereign ratings at A+/A-1 with a stable outlook, per Arab News on Sunday, saying diversified energy infrastructure and fiscal buffers would let the Kingdom withstand the conflict. The agency specifically cited the ability to redirect crude to the Red Sea through the East-West Pipeline, together with storage and refining capacity at home and abroad, as grounds for the stable outlook. It expects real GDP to contract 0.9 percent in 2026, rebound 8.2 percent in 2027 on higher oil production, then average 3.3 percent in 2028 and 2029; it forecasts a fiscal deficit of 5.8 percent of GDP this year narrowing to an average of 3.4 percent in 2027 to 2029, says foreign-exchange reserves are at their highest since early 2020, and notes that the non-oil sector including government now accounts for about 70 percent of GDP against 65 percent in 2018. "The authorities and the country's sovereign wealth fund are recalibrating the pace of project implementation under Vision 2030, which should help contain fiscal deficits and the pace of general government debt accumulation," S&P said. Fitch kept A+ stable in July, and the IMF raised its 2027 growth forecast to 5.5 percent from 4.5 percent.

This resolves the observable Edition 11 set on whether a rating agency would name the pipeline: S&P named it as a strength, in a document that reached the market within a day of the line being shut. The agency's 2027 rebound rests on the production recovery that the August OPEC figure of 6.2 million barrels a day, and the Kpler export figure of 3.1 million, show has not begun; the stable outlook therefore carries an implicit assumption about the restart that Riyadh has not yet supplied.

Assessment

The judgment is that the affirmation is a statement about buffers, not about flows, and buffers are what the next five to seven days will draw down. An A+ rating with reserves at a six-year high is exactly the balance sheet that lets Riyadh decline to sign an Omani text and decline to retaliate against Iraq; it is also the balance sheet that a six-week pipeline outage would begin to test, since the 5.8 percent deficit assumed the Yanbu bypass. The observable is whether S&P, Fitch or Moody's issues a comment on the shutdown before the restart date, and whether the Ministry of Finance's next debt issuance is priced wider.

The Export Ledger

From 5.1 Million to 3.1 Million in One Month, and Then to a Week of Stocks: The Kingdom's Export Capacity Has Been Cut Twice, First by the Embargo and Now by the Line

Kpler data cited by Roya News put Saudi crude exports at about 3.1 million barrels a day in August, down from 5.1 million in July and the lowest since at least 2013, before the pipeline closure left Yanbu with five to seven days of stocks and Egyptian storage with several more.

Saudi crude exports, July to AugustMillion barrels a day, per Kpler
Kpler estimate, July vs August 2026
3.1m (Aug) 5.1m (Jul)
Kpler via Roya News (Sep 13). Track scaled 0 to 6 million barrels a day. Vessel-tracking estimates, not Aramco or GASTAT data; the August figure is described as approximate. September exports will be lower again if the pipeline stays shut, and are not established.

The export ledger has two entries this month and both are cuts. The first is the Houthi "maritime embargo" declared at the end of July, which per the OPEC report cited by Roya News deterred commercial operators from west-coast terminals, filled domestic storage and forced production down to 6.2 million barrels a day in August; Kpler's export estimate for the month is about 3.1 million barrels a day against 5.1 million in July. The second is Friday's shutdown of the East-West Pipeline, which removes the route that had fed Yanbu with around 4 million barrels a day. Reuters' four industry sources, via the Guardian, put Yanbu's stocks at five to seven days of exports, add several days from Ain Sukhna and Sidi Kerir, and say the stocks are not full and will run out without the line. The Guardian's own summary is that the Kingdom "will run out of oil stocks for export" without a restart within days.

What is not established is as important as what is. Aramco has issued no statement on Yanbu loadings; the Ministry of Energy has given no restart date; there is no published figure for September exports; and the Saudi war-risk pool that Edition 11 flagged, whose capacity and first policy remain unreported in any source fetched today, has not been shown to have written cover for a west-coast lifting since the embargo. S&P's affirmation, above, assumed the bypass; the OPEC figure shows the bypass was already half-used.

Assessment

The judgment is that the Kingdom's export problem is now sequential rather than parallel: the embargo removed the buyers' willingness to lift at Yanbu, and the pipeline removed the supply to Yanbu, so a restart alone returns the Kingdom to August's 3.1 million, not to July's 5.1 million. That is the number diplomats should carry into any conversation about Saudi patience with Washington's intelligence-only offer. The observable is Kpler's or Vortexa's first September loading figure for Yanbu, and any Aramco notice to term customers on October allocations.

Watch Tomorrow · saudi.info's Forward Radar

  1. Hormuz & SecurityA Ministry of Energy or Aramco restart estimate for the East-West Pipeline, still not established after three days, set against the five-to-seven-day Yanbu figure; whether Riyadh or the coalition names any strike in Yemen by place and date, or answers the Sharurah and 58-strike claims; whether UKMTO and Iran confirm that Sunday's Hengam strike and the UKMTO report are the same vessel, and who fired; whether the National Resistance's toll of 500 is matched by any UN count; any Iraqi naming of the group behind the drones now that Shalamcheh is reopening.
  2. The Royal CourtA new date and venue from Muscat for the postponed Gulf-Iran meeting, and whether Oman or Iran publishes the text with or without the amendments attributed to Riyadh; a Saudi readout of Prince Faisal's New Delhi bilaterals; a GCC joint statement on Hormuz replacing the bilateral readouts; a Turkish readout of the Fidan call, not established for a third day; any British statement of Red Sea tasking, not established for a second day; the first House Foreign Affairs hearing notice on the 123 Agreement, not established.
  3. Oil & EnergyMonday's Brent settlement against the $107.51 early print and Friday's $104.61; any change to the two NCAGS transit windows after Sunday's strike, and any confirmed Saudi or Bahri transit inside one; the OPEC monthly report itself, to check the 6.2 million August figure Roya News attributes to it; the diesel crack after the $6 US record and the open-market rial, not established for a fourth day.
  4. The EconomyAny S&P, Fitch or Moody's comment on the shutdown after S&P's affirmation cited the pipeline; Kpler or Vortexa Yanbu loadings for the second week of September; the Saudi war-risk pool's capacity and first policy, not established for a third day; the US CPI print and this week's Fed decision with SAMA's same-hour statement; the Al Rajhi settlement and any PIF or Savvy statement on Electronic Arts, not established for a sixth day; any change to CEER's September 21 date.
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